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LEAD US NOT INTO (UNWARRANTED) TEMPTATION: A
PROPOSAL TO REPLACE THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
WITH A REASONABLE-SUSPICION REQUIREMENT
MAURA F. J. WHELAN t
The use of stings and scams to root out vice and corruption has
received renewed interest in the last five years with the revelations of
Abscam in 19801 and, more recently, the acquittal of bankrupt auto
magnate John Z. DeLorean in his celebrated cocaine trial.' DeLorean
and some of the Abscam defendants claimed entrapment, a doctrine
under which the defendant, although in fact guilty of the crime for
which an indictment has been secured, nevertheless seeks acquittal on
the theory that the police have induced the commission of a crime that
would not have been committed otherwise.' DeLorean prevailed on the
entrapment defense,4 but all of the Abscam defendants were convicted.5
t B.A. 1980, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate, 1986, University of Pennsylva-
nia. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania.
I See Maitland, High Officials Are Termed Subjects of a Bribery Investigation by
F.B.I., N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
" See Lindsey, Jurors Cite Entrapment and Failure to Prove Case, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
1 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 369
(1972).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
1 See United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming convic-
tion); United States v. Silvestri, 719 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming conviction);
United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming convictions of Weisz
and Ciuzio), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1285, 1305 (1984); United States v. Thompson,
710 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1983) (denying motion for retrial), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 702
(1984); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.) (reversing district court's
dismissal and reinstating jury conviction), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983); United
States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (affirming conviction), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 524 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) (Myers II) (af-
firming conviction), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983); United States v. Carpentier, 689
F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming conviction), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983);
United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.) (affirming conviction), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 835 (1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc)
(reversing district court's judgment of acquittal and reinstating jury conviction), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.) (Myers
1) (denying dismissal of indictment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
In addition, several of the Abscam defendants unsuccessfully asserted the so-called
"due process" defense, arguing that the defendants, predisposition notwithstanding,
should be acquitted because of the government's overinvolvement in the commission of
the crimes. See, e.g., Williams, 705 F.2d at 619-22 (asserting due process defense as
well as entrapment); Myers II, 692 F.2d at 835-36 (six of seven defendants relying on
due process and other defenses); Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 606-10 (asserting due process
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Although the last decade has seen an unprecedented use of under-
cover operations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
other federal law enforcement agencies,6 the Supreme Court has not
reevaluated the entrapment doctrine in almost ten years. 7 Recent events
suggest that it is high time the defense was seriously reconsidered. Re-
form is unlikely to come from the judicial branch, as the Supreme
Court has expressed its unwillingness to alter current doctrine. How-
ever, the Court has invited legislative action in the entrapment area.8 In
the wake of Abscam, committees in both houses of Congress turned
their attention to entrapment and other problems raised by certain un-
dercover operations.' Although legislation was introduced during the
ninety-eighth Congress,10 no action was taken on it before the end of
and entrapment defenses).
J . Edgar Hoover was a staunch opponent of undercover activities on the part of
the FBI. After his death in 1972, the Bureau gradually increased its use of undercover
tactics. It was not until after 1975 that these operations took on real significance; be-
tween 1977 and 1981, the number of undercover operations per year increased rapidly,
from 53 in 1977 to 463 in 1981. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY UNDERCOVER AcTivrris
OF COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE U.S.
SENATE, S. REP. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-42 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT]. Total appropriations to the Department of Justice for
undercover activities increased from $1 million in 1977 to over $12 million in 1984.
SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY TOGETHER WITH DISSENTING VIEWS, FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS,
H.R. Doc. No. 267, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1984) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS
COMMITTEE REPORT].
' The last entrapment case decided by the Supreme Court was Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). Prior to that, its most recent consideration had
been in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). Strictly speaking, Hampton is
not an entrapment case. It deals instead with the due process defense, see infra note
202, which was also asserted together with the entrapment defense in Russell. The
entrapment defense was successfully asserted for the first time in the federal courts
seventy years ago, see Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), and
received the Supreme Court's imprimatur seventeen years later, see Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
s See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
* In response to the resignation of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., the United
States Senate created the Select Committee to Study Law Enforcement Undercover Ac-
tivities of Components of the Department of Justice [hereinafter referred to as the Se-
lect Committee]. See S. Res. 350, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2800-03
(daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982). The Select Committee held 14 days of hearings. See Law
Enforcement Undercover Activities: Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Study Law
Enforcement Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of Justice, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. At the close of the 97th Con-
gress, the Select Committee published its findings. See SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 6. In reaction to Abscam, Congressman Don Edwards, former FBI agent
and chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, held 21
days of hearings over a period of four years to investigate the propriety of federal
undercover operations. See EDWARDS CoMMIrTE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-2.
'0 Early in the 98th Congress, Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., chairman of
the Select Committee, see supra note 9, introduced S. 804, a proposal based on the
Select Committee's findings. The bill stated that no undercover operation should be
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the session.
The entrapment debate has focused on whether current doctrine,
the so-called subjective approach, should be maintained, or whether the
objective approach, endorsed by a minority of the Supreme Court,11
many scholarly commentators,12 and a handful of state courts, 3 should
be adopted in its stead.1 4 The critical distinction between the subjective
initiated, maintained, or expanded in the absence of reasonable suspicion and required
specificity with regard to the target and the alleged ongoing criminality. Findings of
reasonable suspicion were to be made by an Undercover Operations Review Committee
within the Department of Justice or, in certain circumstances, by the head of the field
office in charge. Failure to comply with the reasonable-suspicion requirement would
neither be available as a defense in a criminal prosecution nor provide a basis for a civil
action against the government. Finally, the bill adopted the objective approach to the
entrapment defense. See S. 804, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S2797-2801
(daily ed. Mar. 14, 1983).
" The members of the Supreme Court adhering to the objective approach include
Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone, concurring in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932); Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, concurring in Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); and Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Bren-
nan (again), dissenting in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and United
States v. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1114 (1951); Goldstein, For Harold Lass-
well: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the
Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 687-90 (1975); Rotenberg, The Police Detection
Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871, 899-903 (1963). The objective ap-
proach has been endorsed by the Select Committee, see SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 371, and was incorporated in S. 804, supra note 10. The objective
approach has also been endorsed by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code. See infra note 116.
1 The supreme courts of Alaska, Iowa, and Michigan have adopted an objective
test. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969); State v. Mullen, 216
N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 19-20, 210 N.W.2d
336, 342 (1973). Hawaii, North Dakota, and New Hampshire have adopted the objec-
tive test by statute. See 1972 Hawaii Sess. Laws act 9, § 237; N.D. CNr. CODE §
12.1-05-11 (Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1974); see also Park, The
Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 168 n.16 (1976) (discussing state
statutes).
14 Most writers focus on whether or not the traditional, "subjective" approach
should be replaced by the "objective" test advanced by a minority of the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Park, supra note 13, at 165-66 (1976); Rotenberg, supra note 12, at
897-903 (1963). Others have fashioned new methods for dealing with government over-
reaching in undercover operations. See, e.g., Dix, Undercover Investigations and Po-
lice Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203, 221, 223-24 (1975) (setting forth an omnibus
proposal for improving undercover operations); Gershman, Abscam, theJudiciary, and
the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1587-88 (1982) (proposing a statute
that would prohibit the use of entrapment techniques against anyone not reasonably
suspected of crime and proscribe police methods that are unreasonable, that are taken
in bad faith, or that cause or threaten substantial harm to individuals or society); Note,
The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 63, 67-68, 72-73, 80 (1967) (suggesting due process clause, privilege against self-
incrimination, and fourth amendment as constitutional bases for the entrapment defense
and recommending a test requiring probable cause prior to solicitation and reasonable-
ness in execution) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Defense of Entrapment]; Note, The
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and objective formulations of the entrapment defense is the underlying
policy purpose each purports to serve. The policy emphasized by the
subjective approach is that innocent individuals should not be led into
crime by the police. 15 The objective approach is animated exclusively
by a concern with whether or not the conduct of the police was accept-
able."6 Of course, these policy goals are not mutually exclusive. What
differentiates them is the subject on which they focus. The subjective
view looks to the character of the individual defendant, while the objec-
tive view looks to the actions of law enforcement officers.-' These in-
quiries can yield identical 8 or contrary 9 results.
After a brief review of the facts of the DeLorean and Abscam
cases, this Comment attempts to demonstrate that the subjective ap-
proach to entrapment is theoretically untenable because it is based on
the rationale that the defendant, although induced to commit a crime by
Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment
Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 953 (1965) (suggesting an alternative system in which
"[tihe fact of a successful solicitation would not in itself give rise to criminal liability; it
would only be relevant as evidence of an independently existing course of criminal
conduct") [hereinafter cited as Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me]. One writer has con-
cluded that, whatever analysis is applied, the entrapment defense is a "fundamentally
erroneous doctrine." Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal
Justice Dilemma, 5 Sup. CT. REV. 111, 113 (1981) ("[E]ntrapment doctrine is one of a
number of adaptive mechanisms which compensate for our failure to develop a coherent
theory of blame and choice to regulate the imposition of criminal punishment.").
1" See Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 898.
16 See id. at 899.
17 The subjective view asks whether or not the defendant is an "otherwise inno-
cent" individual, Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932), who "was in-
duced to commit [a crime] by the Government," United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
435 (1973). This approach endeavors to establish whether or not the defendant was
"predisposed"-that is, whether the offered inducement merely provided a welcome
opportunity to an existing criminal or created a new criminal. See, e.g., Russell, 411
U.S. at 429. The objective approach is concerned with police impropriety, see Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and attempts
to evaluate the investigating officer's conduct without inquiring into the defendant's
state of mind, see Russell, 411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The "objective"
measure of police conduct is generally an inquiry into whether or not an "average law-
abiding citizen" would have been lured into criminality by a similar inducement. See
Park, supra note 13, at 173.
"8 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Sherman was a re-
covering heroin addict who met government informant Kalchinian in a doctor's office
where both were seeking help for their narcotics habits. Kalchinian, feigning serious
withdrawal symptoms, prevailed upon Sherman to secure some narcotics for him. Only
after repeated pleadings did Sherman give in. The majority held that he was an other-
wise innocent individual who was not predisposed to crime. See id. at 373. The concur-
ring minority, per Justice Frankfurter, stated that the impropriety of the informant's
action barred prosecution of the case. See id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). The Court applied the
subjective test and held that there had been no entrapment. See id. at 429, 436. The
dissenters would have found entrapment based on an application of the objective test.
See id. at 438-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 441-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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government officials, is "otherwise innocent." The Comment argues
that identifying and curbing undesirable police conduct is the only
sound goal of the entrapment defense. The objective approach does not
accomplish this goal because it presupposes a universal standard of mo-
rality by which it measures the reactions of suspects. A proper ap-
proach would define a permissible standard of conduct by which to
measure police behavior.
The use of encouragement tactics by undercover agents can pose
grave threats to individual privacy and integrity.20 At the same time, it
is clear that as long as the federal government continues to prosecute
victimless or consensual crimes, such as bribery, gambling, or narcotics
trafficking, law enforcement authorities must be allowed to use under-
cover tactics. 2 ' In order to balance individual rights and liberties with
legitimate law enforcement objectives, Congress should limit the use of
inducement techniques to situations in which they can be fully justified.
This Comment argues that police encouragement tactics should be al-
lowed only when law enforcement officials can demonstrate reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is involved in ongoing criminal activity. Fur-
ther, the Comment proposes that entrapment operations be subject to a
warrant requirement, and that a warrant be issued only after a show-
ing of reasonable suspicion. Compliance wfth the warrant, as well as
the basis for its issuance, would be evaluated in a pretrial motion, and
the defense of entrapment would be abolished.
I. SOME ANECDOTAL BACKGROUND
A. John Z. DeLorean
According to newspaper accounts of the DeLorean trial, by 1980
20 See Dix, supra note 14, at 211-12 (asserting that undercover operations have
an impact on the individual's sense of personal privacy, privacy in interpersonal rela-
tionships, and the individual's first amendment interest in freedom of association); see
also S. 804, supra note 10, at S2798 (requiring "probable cause [rather than reason-
able suspicion] to believe that the [undercover] operation is necessary to detect or pre-
vent specific acts of criminality" if the operation involves (1) infiltration of a political,
governmental, religious, or news organization, or (2) impersonation of an attorney,
physician, clergyman, or newsperson, and "there is a significant risk that another indi-
vidual will enter into a confidential relationship with that person").
21 See SELECT COMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 (stating that because
"organized crime and consensual crimes such as narcotics trafficking, fencing of stolen
property, and political corruption" are the main challenges of law enforcement today,
and because criminals are "increasingly powerful and sophisticated . . ., some use of
the undercover technique is indispensable to the achievement of effective law enforce-
ment"). But see EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 ("not at all clear
that comparable resources devoted to traditional, reactive investigatory methods would
not be as effective as the undercover techniques" in curbing consensual crimes).
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the DeLorean Motor Company was in dire financial straits.12 John Z.
DeLorean, the company's chairman, desperately needed ten million
dollars in order to salvage the company." Around this time, former
neighbor and occasional narcotics dealer James Timothy Hoffman got
in touch with DeLorean and invited him to participate in a major co-
caine transaction.24 Hoffman, an admitted perjurer 25 who had been
working as an FBI informant for some time prior to the DeLorean
incident,28 said that DeLorean was the first to raise the subject of
drugs: DeLorean wanted to make money quickly in a big narcotics deal
and hoped that Hoffman would be able to arrange something. 7 Before
Hoffman came forward with his allegations, the FBI had no reason to
believe that DeLorean was involved in the drug scene in any way.2
The original scenario devised by the participants in the cocaine
transaction was the following: DeLorean would invest two million dol-
lars toward the purchase of the cocaine and would make as much as
sixty million dollars in profit from its resale.29 This arrangement be-
came unworkable, however, when DeLorean revealed that he would
have to withdraw from the op6ration due to his inability to raise the
two million dollars.30 At this time, either FBI agent Benedict Tisas' or
Hoffman3 2 offered an alternative. Under the new proposal, DeLorean
simply had to put up two million dollars worth of collateral, which
included several sports cars, -spare parts, and other property.3
DeLorean also signed over the entire voting stock of DeLorean Motor
Company, Inc., to the federal agents who were posing as drug deal-
22 See Cummings, Drug Talk in 1980 Laid to DeLorean, N.Y. Times, May 19,
1984, at A6, col. 1.
2' See Cummings, Tapes Depict DeLorean as Eager for Drug Deal, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 25, 1984, at A16, col. 4.
24 See Cummings, supra note 22; Cummings, Witness Uncertain DeLorean In-
tended Drug Deal, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1984, at A18, col. 4.
25 See Taylor, Feds Run Into an Entrapment Backlash, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1984, § 4, at 2, col. 3.
2' See Cummings, supra note 22.
27 See id.
28 See Official Says DeLorean Wasn't Suspect at First, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1984, at A6, col. 6.
29 See Cummings, Defense Cites DeLorean's "Fear" of Drug Dealers, N.Y.
Times, July 4, 1984, at A7, col. 1. DeLorean was ultimately indicted for conspiracy to
distribute fifty-five pounds of cocaine with a street value of $24 million. See Cummings,
Agent Admits Financing Plan Kept DeLorean in Drug Deal, N.Y. Times, May 12,
1984, at A29, col. 1.
so See Cummings, Agent Admits Financing Plan Kept DeLorean in Drug Deal,
N.Y. Times, May 12, 1984, at A29, col. 1.
3' See id.
32 See Cummings, Prosecutor's Role in Inquiry on DeLorean Is Questioned, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1984, at A15, col. 4.
" See Cummings, supra note 30.
[Vol. 133:1193
REPLACING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
ers. 3 ' Finally, Tisa recommended that DeLorean be sure to launder
any profits from the transaction through one of his companies.3 5
The jury had little trouble acquitting DeLorean. 6 Interviews with
several jurors after the trial indicated that the acquittal was based both
on disapproval of the government's tactics in its investigation of
DeLorean and on the conclusion that the government had failed to
prove that DeLorean had committed a crime.7 Because DeLorean was
prosecuted in federal court, the judge instructed the jury to evaluate the
entrapment defense in accordance with the subjective view.38 However,
it seems from the jurors' remarks that they followed the objective ap-
proach instead. 9 Those jurors who discussed the entrapment issue with
reporters emphasized the impropriety of the operation, not DeLorean's
character.
40
One juror expressed the view that the FBI went after DeLorean
only because he was an influential person.4' There were several indica-
tions that the agents viewed DeLorean as a highly desirable arrest. One
agent referred to DeLorean as his "meal ticket."' 42 Hoffman boasted to
anxious agents two months before DeLorean's arrest that he was "go-
ing to get [DeLorean] for you guys." '43 Tisa testified that the FBI
agents intended to arrest DeLorean when the cocaine was delivered re-
gardless of how he reacted-unless, of course, his response was to call
the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.44 It was undoubtedly the
spirit of the hunt that led Tisa to report to FBI headquarters that
DeLorean was "involved in large scale narcotics transactions, in addi-
tion to the laundering . . . of large amounts of illegally received in-
"' See Cummings, Defense Cites DeLorean's "Fear" of Drug Dealers, N.Y.
Times, July 4, 1984, at A7, col. 1.
"' See Cummings, Agent Says He Opened DeLorean Drug Talks, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1984, at A24, col. 1.
31 See Lindsey, Jurors Cite Entrapment and Failure to Prove Case, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 3. Although the deliberations lasted for twenty-nine hours,
the jury reached the verdict with only a single vote on each count. See id.
W See id.
38 See Kendall, "It's All in God's Hand," Los Angeles Times, Aug. 9, 1984, § 2,
at 1, col. 1.
"' See Lindsey, DeLorean Jurors Discuss Reasons Behind Verdict, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 18, 1984, at A46, col. 1.
40 See id.
41 See id.
4' Defense Presses Agent in DeLorean Case, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1984, at A6,
col. 6.
41 Cummings, DeLorean Informer's Remark Is Trial Issue, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2,
1984, at A14, col. 4.
41 See Cummings, Agent Tells of Plan to Arrest DeLorean with Drugs, N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1984, at A12, col. 4.
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come," 45 although he knew it wasn't true. His explanation for this
message? "I thought it sounded pretty good."
46
B. Political Corruption: Abscam
In the winter of 1980, America was shocked by the news that six
United States Congressmen, one United States Senator, a United States
Immigration Service official, three members of the Philadelphia City
Council, the mayor of Camden, New Jersey, and assorted bagmen,
middlemen, and corrupt lawyers had been duped by an elaborate FBI
operation called Abscam.47 Under the cover of Abdul Enterprises, Ltd.,
FBI agent Anthony Amoroso 48 and informant Melvin Weinberg, a con-
victed confidence man,49 posed as frontmen for a fictional pair of
wealthy Arab sheiks interested in making certain investments and se-
curing certain favors.50 The Abscam defendants demonstrated that they
were amenable to selling their offices in order to do business with the
sheiks. Some were zealous and some were hesitant, but all were on
videotape.
Between 1978 and 1980, Abscam went through several stages. It
began as a standard sting operation 5 to recover stolen art and securi-
ties.52 In 1978, its focus shifted to political corruption in the New
Jersey area.5" By 1979, the Abscam operatives had turned their atten-
45 Id.
46 Id.
'1 See Maitland, supra note 1.
48 See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1462 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 264 (1983). Although Weinberg was involved in Abscam from its inception,
Amoroso did not join until 1979, when he assumed the role of president of Abdul
Enterprises. See id.
49 See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 961 (1983).
"o See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 264 (1983).
5' "Stings" are far less complex than the operations on which this Comment fo-
cuses. In setting up a sting, undercover operatives develop a front for a supposedly
illegal enterprise, such as a fencing operation, and leak the news that there is an illegal
enterprise operating in the neighborhood. The agents then wait for interested parties to
arrive. No inducement or encouragement is required, and the very arrival of the parties
indicates their guilt. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 958-59 (statement of Jerry J.
Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). Although stings do not
raise many of the concerns implicated by the more sophisticated entrapment techniques,
they do, at the very least, involve the expenditure of scarce resources. For that reason
alone, stings should be initiated only when there is reasonable suspicion of ongoing
criminality of a particular kind in the targeted locality. See, e.g., infra note 178 and
accompanying text.
52 See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 961 (1983).
11 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 961 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative
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tion to the "Asylum Scenario," wherein members of Congress promised
to introduce private immigration bills for the sheiks in exchange for
cash.54 Finally, in January of 1980, shortly before closing up shop for
good, Weinberg applied his talents to the exposure of corruption in the
municipal government of Philadelphia.5
The reason for the shift from stolen property to corruption in New
Jersey politics is not entirely clear. One version of the story is that one
of Abdul Enterprises' contacts from the first phase of Abscam confided
to the undercover agents that there were politicians for sale in New
Jersey, notably Mayor Angelo Errichetti of Camden.56 However, there
is also evidence indicating that Weinberg had been looking into the po-
litical corruption question on his own before he received this tip.5" Ac-
cording to one court's account, Errichetti appeared at the door of Abdul
Enterprises during the initial stage of Abscam and boasted to the
sheiks' men of his influence and expertise with respect to casinos, nar-
cotics, and the mob.5"
It is not clear whether Weinberg or Amoroso59 was the creative
genius behind the Asylum Scenario.60 One day in Florida aboard the
yacht of his supposed employers, Amoroso discussed with Errichetti the
potential difficulties for the sheiks should a revolution, like those that
befell Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza and the Shah of Iran,
occur in their country."1 The solution, of course, would be to secure
permanent resident alien status for the sheiks. The affable mayor as-
sured Amoroso that he could secure the aid of influential public offi-
Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
" See id. at 964.
51 See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
58 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 961 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative
Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
57 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 1.66-67 (testimony of Francis M. Mullen, Jr.,
Executive Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
58 See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 961 (1983).
'9 See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1463 n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 264 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 830 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
80 The Asylum Scenario first went into action in July 1979. See United States v.
Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). It is very
likely that the idea arose from a successful undercover operation that Amoroso and
Weinberg had undertaken beginning in March of that year, when they met a corrupt
immigration official who could make immigration problems disappear for the right
price. See United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 36-39 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 835 (1982).
61 See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 264 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 830 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2437 (1983).
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cials who would use their influence on the sheiks' behalf."2 Through
Errichetti and other middlemen,"3 the Asylum Scenario successfully en-
snared Congressmen Michael "Ozzie" Myers,8 Raymond Lederer, 5
Frank Thompson,"8 John Murphy,67 Richard Kelly," and John Jen-
rette," each of whom promised to introduce private relief legislation for
the sheiks in exchange for $50,000 or more.
70
The fourth phase of Abscam was initiated shortly before Abdul
Enterprises closed its doors forever.7 1 Turning his sights to the munici-
pal government of Philadelphia, Weinberg contacted an associate from
his earlier adventures and told him that the sheiks were "'looking to
build a hotel' in Philadelphia,"7' 2 and would need contacts among local
officials. These contacts turned out to be members of the city council,
who were asked to lobby their colleagues concerning the desirability of
the sheiks' proposal. The venture had a double appeal for the Philadel-
phia defendants since it not only put money in their pockets, but prom-
ised considerable economic gain for the city as well.
73
Councilman Harry Jannotti seemed hesitant about accepting his
82 See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 264 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
'S "The term 'middleman' refers to individuals who unwittingly act as in-
termediaries between the FBI and the principal targets of undercover investigations.
Although informants, confidential sources, and cooperating sources in these operations
may also act as intermediaries, they understand that they are working with the FBI."
EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
" See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 961 (1983).
85 See id. at 831-32.
" See id. at 832-33.
* See United States v. Murphy, 715 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1983).
See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
264 (1983). The sheiks also intended to make investments in the districts of cooperative
congressmen. See id. at 1465.
'9 See United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
70 See also United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (while not involving
the Asylum Scenario, the charges against Senator Harrison Williams arose from his
promising to use his office to help secure government contracts for a mining ven-
ture-in which he had an interest-in exchange for the sheiks' agreeing to invest in,
and subsequently agreeing to buy, the venture), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983).
7' The Abscam operation ended on February 2, 1980. See SELECT COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 312.
72 United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (quoting a
phone conversation between Weinberg and Howard Criden, a Philadelphia attorney,
who had previously served as a middleman between the FBI and several congressmen),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
7' The sheik was to invest $150 million in the city. See id. at 584. It is not clear
whether Jannotti and codefendant George Schwartz, former President of the Philadel-
phia City Council, were led to believe that Philadelphia would lose the project if they
did not agree to take the bribe. See id. at 602-03.
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$10,000 bribe: he repeatedly asked the FBI agents about the legitimacy
of the project. 4 Jannotti was assured that taking the money was essen-
tial to maintaining the good will of the sheiks. 5 The sheiks considered
it very important to make friends with the people they were doing busi-
ness with, and the only way to do that was with money. This way of
doing business might seem unusual to an American, admitted FBI
agent Wald, but was nevertheless characteristic of the "Arab mind.1
78
Reassured, Jannotti took the money."
The Abscam defendants were less fortunate than John DeLorean.
In every Abscam case, the defendants were convicted by the juries, and
every conviction was upheld on appeal. In both Councilman Jannotti's
and Congressman Kelly's trials, the presiding judge dismissed the in-
dictments after the jury's finding of guilt78 but was reversed by the
appellate court." Most of the defendants appealed their convictions to
the Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied in every instance.8"
II. CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. The Subjective Approach
When the Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense
in the landmark decision of Sorrells v. United States,"' the majority
"I See id. at 587-89. Jannotti's concern with legitimacy was with whether the
project would be used for gambling; Schwartz's concern was whether it would be used
for "immoral purposes." Id. at 601.
75 See id. at 588-89.
78 Id.
7 See id. at 589.
78 See United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d
1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F.
Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
" See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1474 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 264 (1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 611 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
80 See Ciuzio v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1305 (1984), denying cert. to 718 F.2d
413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Weisz v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1285 (1984), denying cert. to
718 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Ciuzio was tried with Weisz); Thompson v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 702 (1984), denying cert. to 710 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1983); Williams
v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 524, denying cert. to 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983); Kelly v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 264, denying cert. to 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Myers
v. United States, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), denying cert. to 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982);
Carpentier v. United States, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983), denying cert. to 689 F.2d 21 (2d
Cir. 1982); Alexandro v. United States, 459 U.S. 835, denying cert. to 675 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1982); Jannotti v. United States, 457 U.S. 1106, denying cert. to 673 F.2d 578 (3d
Cir. 1982) (en banc); Myers v. United States, 449 U.S. 956, denying cert. to 635 F.2d
932 (2d Cir. 1980).
81 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Sorrells, Martin, a prohibition agent, induced Sorrells
to procure some whiskey for him. At first, Sorrells refused. But Martin, who had be-
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endorsed the subjective view of the doctrine. The Supreme Court reiter-
ated its approval of the subjective approach in Sherman v. United
States 2 and, more recently, in United States v. Russell. 3
The subjective approach inquires into the state of mind and char-
acter of the defendant in order to determine whether entrapment has
occurred and condemns police practices only when they lead to the cre-
ation of "new" criminals. "[T]he controlling question [is] whether the
defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is
seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the
creative activity of its own officials." 4
To determine whether the defendant is an "otherwise innocent"
individual, a court must ascertain whether or not the defendant was
"predisposed" to commit the crime.8 5 Entrapment will be found where
"the officials of the Government . . . implant in the mind of an inno-
cent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute."8" Police are not permit-
ted to create crime or criminals, but such creation of crime is thought to
be possible only in the case of the nondisposed.87 An offer that, when
made to a nondisposed defendant, is considered impermissible police
activity, is looked upon as one simulated opportunity in a series of
many authentic ones when a predisposed defendant is involved.,
Thus, under the subjective approach, any defendant found to be
predisposed will be convicted regardless of the excessiveness of the in-
ducement, and any nondisposed defendant will be acquitted no matter
how reasonable, objectively considered, the inducement may appear.8 9
Although both the predisposed and the nondisposed have been led into
crime, the former is simply careless-an "unwary criminal"-while the
friended the defendant by telling him that they had been in the same division in the
army during World War I, asked Sorrells three times to get the whiskey. Finally,
Sorrells relented. Id. at 439-40.
82 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958). For recitation of the facts, see supra note 18.
83 411 U.S. 423, 428-33 (1973).
84 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
11 See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. Entrapment doc-
trine seeks to "avoid stimulating the commission of an offense by persons who in fact do
not create a sufficient danger to society." Dix, supra note 14, at 246.
88 Sorrelis, 287 U.S. at 442.
87 Id. at 444-45. "'[D]ecoys may be used to entrap criminals, and to present op-
portunity to one intending or willing to commit crime. But decoys are not permissible
to ensnare the innocent and law-abiding into the commission of crime.'" Id. at 445
(quoting Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924)).
" See Donnelly, supra note 12, at 1108; Seidman, supra note 14, at 118. One
commentator has persuasively argued that "little basis exists for predicting how likely it
is that such an offense would be committed if law enforcement personnel did not inter-
fere." Dix, supra note 14, at 256.
89 See Seidman, supra note 14, at 115.
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latter is naive and entitled to protection-an "unwary innocent." 90
To prove its case, the prosecution must somehow demonstrate the
defendant's predisposition at the time of the alleged inducement. 91 One
method is to demonstrate by the facts of the incident itself the defen-
dant's "ready complaisance" to commit the offense.92 To show this, the
prosecution need only point to the defendant's ready acceptance of the
proposal, seeming knowledge of how to commit the crime, or any infor-
mation that might have been revealed in the midst of the transaction
regarding the defendant's criminal propensities.9 3
Although this approach may not seem problematic at first, it is
fatally circular. For, to have any logic at all, the predisposition inquiry
must depend on the defendant's state of mind prior to the offense. It is
hard to see how the defendant's behavior in the course of committing
the crime advances this inquiry. Unless the defendant has been physi-
cally coerced into accepting the inducement, it is a mere form of words
to assert that there was no disposition to err at the very time the crimi-
nal design was consummated.9" Knowledge of how to commit the crime
90 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
9' Once the entrapment defense has been raised, the burden of production is on
the defendant, who must show that the crime was "induced" by a government agent or
informant. Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 202-03 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 816 (1966). The prosecution then has the burden of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant was predisposed and "ready and willing [and] awaiting
any propitious opportunity to commit the offence." United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d
880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); accord Sagan-
sky, 358 F.2d at 202-03. The issue will then go to the jury for a factual determination.
Although detractors of the subjective approach have been particularly critical of its
assignment of the decisionmaking authority to the jury, Park has called entrapment "a
quintessential jury issue." Park, supra note 13, at 178.
912 See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375; Park, supra note 13, at 183; Note, The Defense
of Entrapment, supra note 14, at 78-79; see also United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d
1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933) (opinion by Judge Learned Hand coining the phrase "ready
complaisance").
9' See Park, supra note 13, at 248.
The predisposition inquiry varies from case to case and court to court. Some
defendants are acquitted because they commit offenses only after showing much hesita-
tion. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439-40. In other in-
stances, the commission of the act is enough to show predisposition. Mr. Jannotti's
repeated expressions of concern about the legitimacy of his transaction with the sheiks
would seem to be enough to suggest a lack of "ready complaisance." See supra notes
74-77 and accompanying text. But neither the jury nor the appellate court were con-
vinced. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 601-03 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). Courts are understandably loath to find a lack of "ready
complaisance" where ambiguous behavior can be explained by an abundance of caution
on the part of defendants. Several Abscam defendants relied on the use of ambiguous
language to mask their knowledge of the illegality of their transactions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 844 (2d Cir. 1982) (Congressman Thompson's
oblique comment-"You look after that for me will you?"-to attorney Criden in ref-
erence to the briefcase of money he received, signified not ignorance of the briefcase's
contents, but a deliberate attempt by Thompson to mask his knowledge should his ac-
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and information about the defendant's criminal history are useful only
in relation to past crimes; they do not indicate predisposition to commit
the present crime. One commentator calls the inquiry into the defen-
dant's state of mind at the time of the offense "evidentiary bootstrap-
ping,"' 95 complaining that "the defendant is said to be predisposed be-
cause he committed the act, and then is held responsible for the act
because he was predisposed."9
The prosecutor may also try to prove predisposition by reference
to the defendant's character. This technique raises what is perhaps the
most persistent criticism of the subjective approach: its reliance on nor-
mally inadmissible evidence such as reputation, rumor, and criminal
history, including prior arrests as well as convictions.97 This kind of
evidence, which is usually considered unreliable and highly prejudi-
cial,98 can chill the use of the entrapment defense by those who think
that the risk of putting such information before the jury outweighs their
tion be discovered), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
. Gershman, supra note 14, at 1581.
Id.
'7On evidence of reputation, see, for example, Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d
529, 530 (5th Cir. 1968) (reputation evidence held competent on issue of predisposi-
tion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1103 (1969). See also Park, supra note 13, at 213-14,
248-52 (federal courts have admitted otherwise inadmissible reputation evidence to re-
fute entrapment defense). On evidence of criminal history, see, for example, Pulido v.
United States, 425 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1970) (arrest years before on narcotics
charge admissible to show predisposition in narcotics case). At least one federal circuit
court has held that the prior arrest must have been for a crime similar to the one
charged in order to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit that crime. See
De Jong v. United States, 381 F.2d 725, 726 (9th Cir. 1967) (arrest for burglary and
drunkenness inadmissible to show predisposition in narcotics case); see also Russell,
411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (entrapment test that depends on predisposi-
tion allows unreliable and highly prejudicial hearsay, suspicion, and rumor evidence to
be introduced).
,S Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459
(Roberts, J., concurring). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence regarding the
defendant's character and past bad acts is not admissible to prove the prosecution's case.
FED. R. EVID. 404. Our legal system maintains this practice because it recognizes that
[t]he natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or
jury-is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhib-
ited and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to
take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation, irrespective of the ac-
cused's guilt of the present charge.
1A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (Tillers rev. ed.
1983).
An exception to the rule on the admissibility of evidence of character and past bad
acts occurs when the defendant introduces evidence of her own character. In this in-
stance, the prosecutor is given the opportunity to rebut. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). Be-
cause the theory of the subjective approach focuses on the "otherwise innocent" nature
of the defendant, use of the entrapment defense implicitly raises the question of charac-
ter. Therefore, it is consistent, strictly speaking, with the Federal Rules to allow the
introduction of such evidence under the entrapment defense.
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chances of prevailing on the entrapment issue. The defendant may end
up being judged not on the basis of the act for which the indictment
was secured but for "a general criminal depravity and wickedness." 99
The Supreme Court has dismissed this objection, however, stating that
"if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct
and predisposition as bearing on that issue. If . . . he suffers a disad-
vantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the
defense."' 00
Reliance on such evidence can lead to two laws of entrap-
ment-one for those with no criminal history and good reputations, and
another for defendants with bad reputations and prior records. Two
defendants, "solicited at the same time in the same manner," 10 1 can
receive different verdicts because of their different personal histories.
Thus, the entrapment defense protects only the otherwise innocent who
have had no prior contact with the law, thereby undermining a basic
tenet of our criminal justice system-that "[p]ast crimes do not forever
outlaw the criminal."
0 2
Furthermore, an approach that allows a finding of predisposition
to be based on evidence of the defendant's past conduct takes a cynical
view of "[t]he whole ameliorative hopes of modem penology," 103 by as-
suming, "to the consternation of penologists, that the defendant has not
been reformed."' ' Thus, the concern that there is no way out of the
criminal justice system once an individual gets into it is explicitly sanc-
tioned by law, and the search for the "otherwise innocent" becomes a
circumstantial rather than a moral inquiry.
Under the subjective approach to entrapment, the prevailing de-
fendant is found innocent, even though all of the elements of the crime
have been satisfied. 05 There are other instances in our criminal law
"Donnelly, supra note 12, at 1108.
100 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
101 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
102 Id. Theoretically, this approach might enable a law enforcement officer to
tempt with impunity an individual whose prior record and bad reputation were known
to him, confident that such an individual would be unlikely to prevail on the entrap-
ment defense. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 443-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Rotenberg,
supra note 12, at 898.
103 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
104 Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 898.
105 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452. In Sorrells, the Court developed an implausible
fiction to get around this problem: in the guise of statutory interpretation, the Court
held that Congress did not intend government officials to enforce the prohibition statute
under which Sorrells was indicted in a manner that would lure otherwise innocent
people into committing crimes. See id. at 448-50. Justice Roberts considered this con-
struction "strained and unwarranted." Id. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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where an individual who has satisfied all of the factual elements of a
crime may be acquitted. Self-defense, duress, and necessity rest on the
premise that the defendant has somehow been deprived of all choice
and has no control over her actions."0 6 Similarly, the insanity defense is
based on the premise that the defendant was incapable of making re-
sponsible or reasoned decisions, and thus could not form the intent nec-
essary to be considered guilty of the crime.10 7 These exceptions to the
normal rules of criminal responsibility seem to be premised on a notion
that individuals can be held responsible only for actions taken
voluntarily.
In the police encouragement situation, the individual's freedom to
act is manipulated; her will and self-control are assaulted; she may feel
driven to do things she will later regret. However, she has not been
entirely deprived of choice or free will. When temptation comes, she
can still say "NO!" 8 When the weak-willed are manipulated into
committing crimes by private individuals, they are not permitted to
raise the entrapment defense.10 9 Consequently, it is reasonable to con-
dude that the only logical basis for the entrapment defense is the role
of the police in the creation of the crime, rather than the belief that a
defendant has been deprived of freedom of choice and is therefore
innocent.
When the courts acquit defendants who are factually guilty, and
who have been neither coerced nor deprived of their faculties in any
tangible way, our whole system of guilt and innocence is thrown into
question. If entrapment doctrine really relies on the innocence of the
defendant rather than on the conduct of the police officer, the theory of
acquitting those who are factually guilty but "otherwise innocent" ar-
guably should extend further. For example, it might be extended to
excuse those individuals who commit property crimes as a response to
poverty. These individuals have been hurt by the economic system, and
prior to engaging in crime they were "otherwise innocent." Their guilt
is attributable to their circumstances. Furthermore, unless one sub-
scribes to a theory of inherent criminality, almost any first offender is
10 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 3, §§ 49-50, 53, at 374-75, 381-83,
391-92.
107 See id. § 36 at 268-71. The insanity defense, which if successful results in the
commitment of the defendant to a mental institution, is also based on a desire to pro-
vide special treatment for certain criminal defendants. Thus, the result of a successful
insanity defense is different from that of a successful plea of self-defense. Id.
"' But ef infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (ability to refuse temptation
does not protect privacy or reputation).
109 See Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Park, supra
note 13, at 240-43 (explaining and justifying the "private-person exception to the en-
trapment defense").
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"otherwise innocent" before breaking the law.
Because of the difficulties involved in any attempt to give sub-
stance to the concept of the "otherwise innocent," it is an extremely
shaky foundation on which to rest the entrapment defense. The method
of determining the defendant's state of mind pursuant to this doctrine is
tenuous, circular, and unfair. The inquiry into the defendant's "ready
complaisance" seems to ensure a finding of predisposition whenever the
crime is committed without prolonged hesitation. The use of character
evidence to prove predisposition presents problems of prejudice and cre-
ates two laws of entrapment, one for those with criminal records and
one for those with clean slates. For these reasons, the subjective view of
entrapment is unsound in theory and unfair in practice. The focus on
the defendant's character is misplaced and should be abandoned in
favor of a test that is concerned with police practices.
B. The Objective Approach
Police misconduct in undercover operations is the focus of the ob-
jective view of the entrapment defense. The objective approach was ar-
ticulated in the concurring opinions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells10
and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman." Both Frankfurter and Roberts
rejected the majority's reliance on a defendant's predisposition as a
method of defining and limiting impermissible entrapment techniques.
Instead, they spoke of executive lawlessness and judicial integrity. Rob-
erts deplored the idea of a court's defiling "the purity of its own tem-
ple" by opening its doors to "such prostitution of the criminal law." '12
Frankfurter was particularly critical of the use of prejudicial evidence
to establish predisposition. He argued that "[n]o matter what the defen-
dant's past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths
to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct
to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced
society."118
Neither concurrence set down clear rules about how an objective
entrapment defense might work. Roberts' view, which has not gained
wide acceptance even among adherents of the objective approach, was
that the issue of entrapment can be raised by the defendant or the judge
(since it is the sanctity of the judicial temple that is being compromised)
110 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
11 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
112 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
18 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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at any point in the proceedings.11 Frankfurter adhered to the more
orthodox view of treating the entrapment issue exclusively as a defense,
but he did not subscribe to the pretense that the defendant is actually
innocent.
1 1 5
Although Frankfurter did not lay down a clear rule, a portion of
his opinion has been adopted as the standard formulation for what
courts and commentators have come to call the "hypothetical person"
approach. Encouragement tactics are permissible, in Frankfurter's
view, as long as they are not "likely to induce . . . the commission of
crime . . . [by] persons . . . who would normally avoid crime and
through self-struggle resist ordinary temptation. . . . [The court
should focus on] the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would en-
trap only those ready and willing to commit crime." '
The hypothetical-person standard is closely related to the tort law
concept of the reasonable person.11 7 The reasonable person standard
measures the conduct and reactions of the defendant against those of an
imaginary reasonable person."' Under the hypothetical-person stan-
dard, a court "objectively" evaluates the propriety of police conduct by
asking what the average law-abiding citizen would have done under the
I" See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also Rotenberg,
supra note 12, at 902 (arguing that the trial and appellate courts, as well as the defen-
dant, should be able to raise the entrapment issue).
"a See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
l Id. at 384. For a critique of Frankfurter's opinion, see Goldstein, supra note
12, at 689-90. For an institutional adoption of Frankfurter's approach, see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (1962). The supporters of the subjective approach point to
the anomalous results likely to occur under an application of the hypothetical-person
doctrine. They argue that "nondisposed" defendants will be convicted when police in-
ducements are deemed appropriate, while "predisposed" defendants will be acquitted
because police activities were impermissible. See Park, supra note 13, at 216-17. Advo-
cates of the objective approach respond that it is an acceptable compromise to let
criminals go free because the constable blundered. Procedurally, the subjective and ob-
jective approaches differ in that the latter generally does not permit the admission of
"prejudicial" evidence. But see id. at 201-09 (arguing that evidence of predisposition
bearing on the propriety of police conduct should be admitted under the hypothetical-
person standard and finding that several jurisdictions support admitting such evidence).
The most important procedural difference between the two approaches is that the ob-
jective approach leaves the decisionmaking authority in the hands of the judge so that
proper standards for police encouragement techniques can be developed. See id. at 268.
But cf id. at 269-70 (noting with respect to the objective approach the advantages of
allowing the jury to decide the entrapment issue).
"I See, e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KErEToy ON THE LAW OF TORTS 173-75 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER
& KEETON]. Park compares the hypothetical person of the objective entrapment stan-
dard to the reasonable person of torts in order to support the allowance of predisposi-
tion evidence. He argues that in both cases one must endow the legal abstraction with
some of the actual qualities of the defendant. See Park, supra note 13, at 204.
11" See PRossER & KEETON, supra note 117, at 173-75; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
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same circumstances. To say that this inquiry provides an objective mea-
sure of police practices is sheer pretense. By focusing on the defendant,
the hypothetical-person standard gauges police conduct only in relation
to the defendant's character or predisposition.
Because this minority approach requires the defendant to match
the moral integrity and self-control of the hypothetical person, it
neither objectively evaluates police tactics nor declines to consider the
defendant's predisposition." 9 By presupposing a universal behavioral
norm, the hypothetical-person approach establishes criteria of morality
by which to evaluate a defendant's reactions to police inducements,
rather than independent standards by which to measure the legality of
those inducements.
,Indirectly, at least, the defendant's past and other situational fac-
tors will still be used to obtain a conviction under the objective ap-
proach. Persons with unsavory histories, inhabitants of certain environ-
ments, and people made desperate by some emotional, social, or
economic crisis will arguably not meet the hypothetical standard of mo-
rality. Like the supersensitive or eggshell plaintiffs of tort law,120 indi-
viduals unable to meet the hypothetical-person standard have a lower
level of tolerance or endurance than the rest of us. We are not all made
of the same hearty stuff,12 and it does not seem fair that we should be
119 Several commentators have pointed out the objective view's reliance on predis-
position. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 14, at 254 ("Even under the minority 'objective'
test, predisposition is quintessential; whether the methods used invoke entrapment de-
pends upon whether they create a substantial risk that an offense would be committed
by persons hypothetically reasonable and unpredisposed."); Goldstein, supra note 12,
at 690 ("Frankfurter's opinion tends to blur the focus on the conduct of authorities by
apparently restoring some relevance to making a distinction, however indistinct, be-
tween criminally and non-criminally prone citizens. He thus reintroduces the very ele-
ment which formed the basis of his challenge to the majority of the Court.") (footnote
omitted); Park, supra note 13, at 245 ("[T]he only difference [between the objective
standard and the subjective standard] is that the fact-finder is asked to consider the
impact of an inducement upon an imaginary nondisposed person instead of a real de-
fendant."); Seidman, supra note 14, at 120 ("[I]n most cases, both the objective and
subjective approaches would permit an inducement, so long as the defendant is
predisposed.").
120 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 117, at 291-92 & 292 n.97 (defendant
liable for death of plaintiff with "eggshell skull" even though normal person would
only have suffered a bump on the head) (citing Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K.B. 669,
679).
121 In certain instances, the hypothetical-person standard will take account of indi-
vidual weakness. See Park, supra note 13, at 173-74. However, the weaknesses ac-
counted for are likely to be only those of which the hypothetical person can be proud,
like sentiment and sympathy. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383-84 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also Seidman, supra note 14, at 122 (explaining Sherman and Sorrells
under the hypothetical-person standard by arguing that an average person might re-
spond to the sentimental pleas of an officer); cf Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441 (opinion
espousing subjective standard mentions officer's appeal to sentiment).
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evaluated as if we were. Just because the defendant is more vulnerable
to temptation than the average law-abiding citizen, it is not apparent
that any legitimate purpose is served by subjecting that individual to a
randomly administered morality test. In fact, one can argue that the
weak are far more in need of protection from police encouragement
than the strong.
122
Even assuming that the hypothetical-person standard is a fair de-
vice for determining when the entrapment defense should prevail, how
can we measure the fortitude of the average law-abiding citizen? Do
we really know what this individual is capable of? 2' The new syndi-
cated television program, "'People Will Do Anything For Money," '24
raises serious questions about how strong a barrier human dignity can
erect against human greed. Therefore, for both theoretical and practical
reasons, it is better to focus the inquiry upon police misconduct.
C. Police Misconduct
If the entrapment defense has any justification in logic or public
policy, its function must be to define the reach of permissible investiga-
tive activities and the limitations within which law enforcement officers
may be allowed to induce the citizenry to commit illegal acts. Deterring
police misconduct is a more logical and workable goal than the slippery
goal of protecting the "otherwise innocent." Of course, the two policy
goals are not mutually exclusive. The concern over the integrity of po-
lice practices in the entrapment area is grounded on the fear that such
unrestrained activity will do more than just root out elusive criminals,
that it will actually create crime and corrupt the innocent. At the same
time, defendants will tend to look more like innocent victims if the po-
lice activity is objectively offensive.' 25
Several different areas of concern are included under the police
misconduct rubric: judicial integrity,"2" the perversion of law enforce-
122 Cf Seidman, supra note 14, at 135-36 (arguing that in actuality average law-
abiding citizens should be better able to resist police enticements).
12 Cf Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 900 (arguing that police would not be able to
identify the degree of encouragement that would be resisted by law-abiding citizens but
not by ready-and-willing criminals).
124 "Anything for Money" (Paramount Television Domestic Productions 1985;
Fred Travelena, host) ("Once again we've taken our cameras out into the field to see
how much it would take to involve people in situations they would normally avoid.").
125 See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
126 See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455, 457 (Roberts, J., concurring) ("[T]he preserva-
tion of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court."); Casey v. United States,
276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("This prosecution should be
stopped ...[t]o preserve the purity of [the] courts.").
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ment,127 and the creation of crimes that would not have been committed
otherwise"" are a few of the predominant concerns. On a practical
note, judges and commentators have complained about the waste of in-
vestigative resources that would be better devoted to the elimination of
preexisting crime.1 29 Some commentators have expressed the concern
that police inducement tactics are likely to be directed at disfavored
groups 30 or used for political reasons.1 " Others share a distaste for
random virtue tests conducted by the government.13 2 The more pessi-
mistic observers of the human species harbor a fear that any one of us
might not be strong enough to resist temptation or cynically believe that
every one of us has a price. 33 For those who still trust in the basic
127 See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (condemning "en-
forcement of the law by lawless means"); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454, 457 (Roberts, J.,
concurring) (characterizing an entrapment scheme as a "revolting . . . plan" and a
"prostitution of the criminal law"), quoted in Russell, 411 U.S. at 439 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (pur-
pose of the entrapment defense should be to protect the government "from illegal con-
duct of the officers").
128 See EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 ("To the extent that
the investigations involved created crimes, or 'scams,' a conviction obtained does not
necessarily indicate that crime has been reduced, unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the individual convicted was in fact involved or about to be involved in the
same criminal activity prior to the scam."); Dix, supra note 14, at 256 ("[L]ittle basis
exists for predicting how likely it is that such an offense would be committed if law
enforcement personnel did not interfere.").
129 See, e.g., United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Posner, J., concurring); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 615 (3d Cir.) (en
banc) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see also FBI Over-
sight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 139 (1980) (statement of Philip
Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice)
("We impose on ourselves the requirement that there be a well-founded suspicion of
criminal activity in a sector or area before commencing an undercover operation...
for the practical reason that [fishing expeditions] would be wasteful of our scarce inves-
tigative resources.").
120 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 957 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Leg-
islative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (stating that "[w]ithout proper safe-
guards. . . undercover operations may involve. . . improper selective investigations");
Seidman, supra note 14, at 145 ("If the government can offer inducements that no one
would refuse, it can pick and choose the persons who will obey the law. The risk that
this power might be used to punish disfavored groups is obvious.") (footnote omitted).
111 See, e.g., Chevigny, A Rejoinder, 230 NATION 204-05 (1980) (discussing The
Abscam Caper, 230 NATION 161 (1980)).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 377 (D.D.C. 1982) ("I do
not believe that testing virtue is a function of law enforcement."), rev'd on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), vert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983); Hearings,
supra note 9, at 957 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American
Civil Liberties Union) (Safeguards need to be imposed to keep the government from
"testing the virtue of citizens in general.").
133 See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Human
nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without government adding
to them and generating crime."); Seidman, supra note 14, at 150 (claiming that the
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goodness of human nature, there is nevertheless a feeling that our pri-
vacy and personal integrity should not be invaded without good rea-
son.134 This concern is particularly relevant when entrapment schemes
involve the infiltration of friendships... and certain privileged relation-
ships."3 6 Finally, for some observers, any aggressive undercover activity
by law enforcement bespeaks the creation of a police state and must,
therefore, be strenuously monitored.
13 7
Perhaps the most troublesome consequence of a police encourage-
ment program unrestrained by any kind of anterior justification is the
impact of the scam on the target who is not only innocent of any crime
before the fact, but who, by refusing the inducement, manages to re-
main uncompromised. The rights of these wary innocents'38 cannot be
existence of the entrapment defense is necessitated by the widespread belief "that many
of us would succumb to the temptation to which only some of us are daily subjected").
Senator Daniel Inouye, advocating support of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr.,
stated,
Instead of finding corruption, [Abscam] proved that perhaps all of us
are ultimately corruptible. We must live with our weaknesses as human
beings, each in our own way.
It is not, however, the business of the executive branch to test for
weaknesses in any Member of Congress or to attempt to discover at what
point the uncorrupt can be corrupted.
128 CONG. REC. S1472 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1982).
134 See, e.g., Note, The Defense of Entrapment, supra note 14, at 68 ("A citizen
suffers a deprivation of . . . liberty both when he becomes the target of police seduc-
tions and when the state judicial machinery imposes criminal sanctions.").
185 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("The impact of. . . third-party bugging, must. . . be considered such as to under-
mine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one another that is charac-
teristic of individual relationships between citizens in a free society."); cf. Dix, supra
note 14, at 211 n.9 (discussing the adverse effects of government infiltration on the
relationships of members of "Vietnam Veterans Against the War").
1'" Under The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, re-
printed in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 536, undercover operations
in which agents or individuals working with the FBI pose as attorneys, physicians, or
reporters can be authorized only by the Director of the FBI. See id. at 541-42. If an
actual practitioner in such a privileged relationship comes forth to provide confidential
information to the FBI, the FBI must notify the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Criminal Division, discourage the individual from breaching the confidence, and
accept the information only if serious consequences would result from rejection of the
offer. See id. at 527.
113 See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 612-13 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Aldis-
ert, J., dissenting) (comparing the techniques of the FBI in Abscam to those of the
Gestapo), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, Supra
note 6, at 77 (Indiscriminate targeting of subjects is "more the hallmark of a police
state than a free society.").
138 Cf. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (distinguishing between traps for the unwary
innocent and traps for the unwary criminal). The concern for protecting the rights of
the innocent is manifested in other areas of criminal procedure. The state does, on
occasion, arrest and prosecute individuals who are innocent of the crimes charged, just
as the FBI sometimes attempts to induce crimes by individuals who do not succumb to
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vindicated by either of the mainstream entrapment doctrines."3 9 Two
subjects of the Abscam operation who did not succumb to temptation
continued to feel guilty, compromised, distrustful, and uncertain long
after their names had been cleared."" Thus, it is disingenuous to say
that undercover inducements come with their own built-in protection
and safeguard, the target's ability to say "NO!" 4" Willpower may pro-
tect the wary innocents against the commission of crime, but it is no
protection for their interest in psychic privacy14 2 or unbesmirched repu-
the temptation. The difference is that in the trial and arrest contexts, procedural pro-
tections exist that prevent prosecution and arrest of any individual without good cause.
Arrests are made pursuant to probable cause, see, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 36 (1979), and, in the federal system, felony prosecutions go forward pursuant
to grand jury proceedings, see, e.g., Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1066
(D.C. Cir. 1969), or preliminary hearings, see, e.g., Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d
1187, 1198-1200 (D.C. Cir. 1973); FED. R. CRrM. P. 5.1(a). When these procedures
are not followed, the individual has recourse to actions for malicious prosecution and
false arrest. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 191 n.65 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(malicious prosecution), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916; id. at 175 (false arrest). Civil suits
alleging violations of federal constitutional rights can be brought against state officials
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and
against federal officials directly under the United States Constitution, see Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
The approach advocated in this Comment would not preclude the use of induce-
ment schemes that have innocent individuals as targets. It would merely provide inno-
cent persons with the same procedural protection that they, and the guilty, aie afforded
in the context of orthodox criminal procedure.
139 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 977-78 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legisla-
tive Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (recognizing implicitly that the safe-
guards used by Abscam agents would not protect innocent individuals under either the
subjective or objective standard).
140 Senator Pressler will carry this for life . . . .Hardly a day has
gone by since I was named to [the Select] [C]ommittee that [he] has not at
some point during the day on the floor come up and said something to me
about: I hope that maybe I can finally be cleared. And I said to him:
Larry, you are clear, there is no question .... But in his mind he was
tainted.
Hearings, supra note 9, at 208 (statement of Sen. Rudman).
What is it, Bill Hughes, that you did or you said that would really have
your name interjected into the scum of an ABSCAM? Can you tell me
what I did or said at any time, what meetings I might have gone to, what
people I might have talked to, what associations I might have had?
Hearings, supra note 9, at 956 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union) (quoting Congressman William Hughes).
141 But see United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(refusing to condemn the government conduct in Abscam as "outrageous" and thus
violative of due process in part because the defendants "could simply have said 'no' to
the offer") (citation omitted), affd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 961 (1983).
142 Other safeguards, such as requiring agents to make clear the illegal nature of
the proposed activity or to model the activity as closely as possible on a realistic situa-
tion, also fail to protect the privacy interests of innocent individuals. See Hearings,
supra note 9, at 960-61 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American
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tation. These evils can be avoided through clarification and codification
of threshold standards that must be met before any police encourage-
ment operation can be initiated. Only then will "the inducement be-
come[ ] a confirmation of criminality rather than a testing of virtue." 4"
III. REASONABLE SUSPICION
A. Anterior Justification
In many instances, consensual crimes can be prosecuted only
through the use of police encouragement.1 44 Because government offi-
cials must have flexibility in conducting such investigations, 45 this
Comment opposes per se rules aimed at prohibiting particular police
practices deemed unsavory.14 Rather, the approach taken balances the
competing concerns of law enforcement and civil liberties. The aim of
this approach is the prevention, to the greatest degree possible, of the
offering of inducements to the nondisposed, both the unwary and the
wary innocents.1 4 7 Such prevention would serve the interests of the
targeted person and, at the same time, enhance police efficiency: in-
ducement techniques would be available only for use against suspects
who truly pose a danger to society. 4 Police encouragement practices
should be limited by a requirement of reasonable suspicion of criminal
involvement, 49 determined prior to the initiation of the operation. 5
Civil Liberties Union).
143 Id. at 978.
144 See supra note 21.
145 See SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 388-89 (rejecting the war-
rant approach because of the delicacy and unpredictability of informant-government
relationships and because of subtleties that do not inhere in the search context).
141 See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
147 See Dix, supra note 14, at 249-50.
148 See id. at 219.
149 Probable cause would be too high a standard to require. If the officer could
satisfy a level of probable cause to offer an inducement, there would most likely be
probable cause to make an arrest. See EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6,
at 113 (dissenting views) ("[A] probable cause standard would be the death knell to
undercover operations."); cf. Dix, supra note 14, at 220 (arguing that a standard less
stringent than probable cause should be adopted to enable police to obtain evidence to
make arrests). "Reasonable suspicion," a somewhat lower standard of anterior justifica-
tion, was advanced by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to
provide guidance to police when conducting a "stop and frisk." To justify a stop and
frisk, the Court held, the officer must be able to cite "specific and articulable
facts"-bare "hunches" would not suffice. Id. at 21-22. The officer would be expected
to analyze concrete facts through the lens of professional experience. See id. at 21-22;
see also The Attorney General's Guidelines on Criminal Investigations, reprinted in
SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 507 (describing "'reasonable indica-
tion'" standard). But see FBI Undercover Operations: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 418 (1982) (testimony of William Webster, Director, FBI) ("What you have is
a smell.").
10 The reasonable-suspicion standard has not fared well in the federal courts of
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Before offering a criminal inducement to a targeted individual, or
setting up an operation creating an environment in which criminal ac-
tivities will be encouraged, law enforcement officials should be required
to demonstrate that they have reasonable suspicion that the target is
presently involved in ongoing or incipient criminal activity or that such
activity is taking place in the targeted locality.1 51 To ensure that such
appeals. In Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948), the Tenth
Circuit held that reasonable suspicion is a necessary element of the government's proof.
Heath was explicitly overruled on the reasonable-suspicion issue in United States v.
Swets, 563 F.2d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). The
Ninth Circuit has held that reasonable suspicion can overcome the defendants' claims of
entrapment. Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 900 (1954). However, in United States v. Williams, 487 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974), the Ninth Circuit questioned the Trice
court's requirement of reasonable suspicion. Williams held that Trice "did not require
proof of reasonable suspicion to defeat the defense of entrapment." Id. (emphasis
added).
On the other hand, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' endorsements of the reasonable-
suspicion standard have not been overruled or distinguished. See Morales v. United
States, 260 F.2d 939, 940 (6th Cir. 1958) (entrapment found in part because the agents
did not even have a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegal
activity); C.M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1926)
(claim of entrapment defeated because of agents' reasonable suspicion of criminal in-
volvement); see also Park, supra note 13, at 197 nn.112-15 (collecting cases and con-
cluding that most circuits have rejected the reasonable-suspicion approach, which Park
notes has declined in popularity since Russell); Case Comment, Due Process Defense
When Government Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEO. L.J. 1455, 1467 nn.98-
100 (1979) (collecting cases).
151 Many observers agree. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6,
at 377; Dix, supra note 14, at 257. As a response to Abscam, Attorney General Benja-
min Civiletti promulgated guidelines for proper investigative procedures in undercover
operations, which, although newly promulgated, had purportedly been in place during
the Abscam operation. See The Attorney General's Guidelines on Criminal Investiga-
tions and Organizations, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at
504-16; The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted
in SELET COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 536-55; The Attorney General's
Guidelines on FBI Use of Informants and Confidential Sources, reprinted in SELECT
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 517-30. The guidelines require that investiga-
tions be initiated only when "facts or circumstances . . . 'reasonably indicate' [that] a
federal criminal violation has occurred, is occurring, or will occur." The Attorney Gen-
eral's Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Organizations, re-
printed in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 506. To insure that poten-
tial targets are protected from the investigative zeal of agents in the field, the guidelines
set up an internal review structure to check that operations have prior justification. See
The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in SE-
LECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 538-48.
Implicit in the decision of the Department of Justice to promulgate investigative
guidelines is the assumption that the guidelines will be followed by agents. However,
recent experience refutes this supposition. See EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 7 ("The record in [Operation Corkscrew, an investigation into case-fixing by
the Cleveland judiciary] demonstrates that virtually every one of the principal safe-
guards was either directly violated, ignored, or administratively construed in a manner
inconsistent with [its] stated purpose[] with profoundly disturbing results to the FBI,
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strictures are followed, investigators should be required to secure a
warrant from a "neutral and detached magistrate" '152 for the authoriza-
tion of any inducement.15 s The affidavit submitted to the magistrate by
the investigating officer would have to allege: (1) the individual, cate-
gory of individuals, locality, or institution'" targeted; 5 5 (2) the crime
the suspects, and the public."). In the DeLorean trial, federal drug agent John Valestra
admitted backdating authorization documents for a pair of videotaping sessions two
months after the fact. See Cummings, Agent in DeLorean Case Acknowledges Backdat-
ing of Documents, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1984, at A17, col. 1. Asked why he did it,
Valestra responded that he didn't want to "'look bad'" and that "the form was a
'dumb' example of useless Government paperwork." Government Witness Admits Hid-
ing Truth, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1984, at A16, col. 6. The unwillingness of agents to
adhere to the guidelines and the inability of the FBI and the Department of Justice to
enforce them underlines the advisability of a judicially enforceable warrant
requirement.
152 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (fourth amendment protec-
tion requires neutral and detached magistrate, not officers involved in "competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime," to decide whether to allow a search).
15' The interposition of the judiciary between the executive and the people is a
traditional method for protecting civil liberties. Despite what has been said about the
unmanageability of obtaining a warrant in the undercover context, see SE .ECr COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 388, and the danger of allowing the judiciary to
interfere with executive functions, see Hearings, supra note 9, at 931 (statement of
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq., Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Washington,
D.C.), such a requirement is not unprecedented. As part of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress prohibited interception of oral or wire
communications in general, but made an exception for law enforcement officials acting
pursuant to a warrant. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 213, 216-17, 218-21 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2511(1), 2516, 2518 (1982)). In addition, in 1978, Congress passed the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, setting up a special court to consider warrant appli-
cations for surveillance operations involving foreign powers. See Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 103-05, 92 Stat. 1783, 1788-93 (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803-05 (1982)).
Some observers who have considered the feasibility of a warrant in the entrapment
context reject the idea. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 387-89
(opposition to undercover warrant legislation conditioned on belief that federal law en-
forcement agencies will be able to regulate themselves effectively); Hearings, supra
note 9, at 931 (statement of Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq., Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
& Handler, Washington, D.C.) (arguing that such a warrant would violate separation-
of-powers principles). Other observers favor the use of the warrant procedure. See ED-
WARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10, 71-72 (recommending judicial war-
rant requirement "for ongoing and continuing undercover operations" because the in-
ternal review mechanism currently in place does not provide the independence of
judgment and objectivity required to evaluate the sufficiency of the factual predicate);
Wilson, The Real Issues in Abscam, Wash. Post, July 15, 1982, at A19, col. 2 (advo-
cating prior judicial review when congressional figures are targeted to protect separa-
tion of powers); see also Hearings, supra note 9, at 996-1000 (testimony of Jerry J.
Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (arguing for a warrant
requirement but, as a politically feasible alternative, urging that the FBI adopt the
internal review procedures outlined in the Undercover Operations Guidelines, as rec-
ommended by the Select Committee, see SELlcr COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 6,
at 347-49).
154 See Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 875 n.16 (giving an example of institutional
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allegedly committed or about to be committed;156 (3) the grounds on
which this belief is based and the reasons why those grounds are relia-
ble;157 (4) an explanation of why the enforcement goal cannot be
achieved through any less intrusive means; 15 and (5) the structure of
the proposed inducement. The structure requirement would demand a
description of the agent's general plan of action and an assurance that
the plan is as narrowly .tailored as possible to achieve the permissible
law enforcement goals described in the first two sections of the
affidavit.
151
Compliance with the warrant procedure could be raised by the
defendant in a pretrial motion and evaluated in a pretrial hearing. 6 If
crime).
155 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1982) (similar requirement for wiretapping).
This requirement aims at preventing "fishing expeditions" among people not reasona-
bly suspected of crime. It is a way of restraining agents and informants from operating
on whims. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
56 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(i) (1982) (similar requirement for wiretapping).
This requirement also protects against fishing expeditions.
157 This requirement is the heart of the application, because it forces an officer to
set out the grounds for reasonable suspicion and allows an evaluation of the warrant
application's persuasiveness. In this way, officers will be prevented from going ahead
with mere "hunches" or "smell[s]." See supra note 149; see also EDWARDS COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 84 (recommending that warrant "application provide a
full and complete statement of facts and circumstances relied upon").
18 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1982) (similar requirement for wiretapping). Be-
cause of the impact of entrapment techniques on privacy interests, see supra note 20,
the large expenditure of resources required by many undercover operations, see supra
note 129 and accompanying text, and the inability to be entirely certain that the subject
would have committed the illegality without police encouragement, supra note 128, use
of entrapment techniques should be limited to situations in which they are truly neces-
sary. See also EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 84 (recommending
that undercover operations "be used only upon a showing that normal investigations
have been unsuccessful, or are unlikely to succeed, or constitute a danger to lives or
property").
159 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1982) (limitation on duration of wiretap). This
requirement aims at ensuring that the plan of action anticipated by the applying officer
is justified by the grounds for suspicion, the target, and the potential crime. Otherwise,
the officer might be able to get a warrant for one kind of operation and use it as a
jumping-off point for entirely different projects. Although the Department of Justice
Guidelines require, in lieu of a warrant, that authorization applications for undercover
operations be submitted to supervisory personnel, see The Attorney General's Guide-
lines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 539-48, experience shows that the Guidelines are not always followed.
The original Abscam operation, aimed at the recovery of stolen art and securities, was
duly authorized by FBI Headquarters. Its subsequent shifts, however-first to the po-
litical scene in New Jersey and later to the United States Congress-were never re-
ported or submitted for approval to a supervisory authority. See SELET COMMrTTEE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 16; see also supra note 151 (describing other instances in
which agents neglected to follow procedural guidelines).
1-0 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1982) (similar procedure for wiretapping). In
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1932), the government argued unsuc-
cessfully that the defendant should raise any claim of entrapment in a pretrial motion.
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the inducement activity is found to have been justified and warranted,
the hearing will be followed by an ordinary criminal trial. If the defen-
dant prevails on the motion, there will be an absolute bar to prosecu-
tion.16 Thus, the claim of entrapment, like the claim of illegal search
and seizure, will not form part of the defendant's case at trial.
On a procedural level, this approach will be an improvement over
current practice. First, once it has been determined that setting the de-
fendant at liberty is the appropriate sanction for inappropriate police
solicitation, a bar to prosecution is more consistent with our criminal
law and procedure than an acquittal. The defendant is set free not be-
cause of innocence but because public policy dictates that the state's
misfeasance bars prosecution.162 Second, the pretrial motion will be en-
tertained by the judge, thereby keeping prejudicial information from
the jury and ensuring that entrapment case law will be developed by
the judiciary. Finally, the defendant will be spared the dilemma of ad-
mitting factual guilt in order to assert the defense of entrapment.
1 63
The reasonable-suspicion inquiry required for issuance of the
warrant improves on the test for predisposition under the current sub-
jective approach to entrapment in two important respects. First, the in-
quiry will be conducted by a magistrate before the commencement of
the undercover operation. Unless government officials can show that
they reasonably suspect that the target is involved in ongoing criminal
activities, and that it will be difficult to catch the suspect without un-
dercover inducement, there will be no sting or scam at all. The antece-
dent judicial inquiry reduces the likelihood that overzealous agents will
lure wary innocents into crime. Moreover, because the magistrate's rea-
sonable-suspicion inquiry will be held prior to commencement of the
operation, evidence of the target's ready complaisance in committing the
offense will not be considered."' The "evidentiary bootstrapping"
16 5
that bedevils the present inquiry into predisposition will therefore be
eliminated.
Second, the magistrate will consider evidence only of a current
criminal career. Indications of recent criminal activity for which the
subject has not been arrested or indicted would be particularly relevant,
for it is just such activity that makes the target the appropriate subject
161 A proposal by the American Civil Liberties Union would also provide for civil
damages to enforce the warrant requirement. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 999 (testi-
mony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
.62 See Sherman v. United States, 411 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
163 See W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-rT, supra note 3, § 48, at 373.
16 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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of a police encouragement operation. 66 Information about the target's
prior propensity for crime, such as allegations and reports of previous
unindicted activities, arrests, or convictions, might be considered if it is
sufficiently connected with the target's present criminal involvement.
However, the mere fact of prior criminality would not suffice to estab-
lish reasonable suspicion. The proposed reasonable-suspicion inquiry is
based on a recognition that past conduct in itself is not indicative of
present criminal involvement, just as it is not a barometer for determin-
ing predisposition.1 67 Because the reasonable-suspicion inquiry obviates
reliance on evidence of the target's ready complaisance or past conduct,
it is less circular, tenuous, and unfair than the inquiry into predisposi-
tion used under the present subjective approach to entrapment.
B. Codifying the Warrant Requirement
Although any statute codifying the principles described in this
Comment would probably not be based directly on the fourth amend-
ment, 6 " such a statute would nevertheless borrow heavily from fourth
amendment jurisprudence both in its procedures, including the warrant
requirement and the pretrial hearing, and in its concerns with anterior
justification, 6 9  flexibility, 170  and reasonableness.1 7 ' Besides setting
166 See Dix, supra note 14, at 256-57.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
168 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. It is clear that the Supreme
Court is becoming less receptive to claims of fourth amendment violations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985) (upholding a warrantless search of pack-
ages three days after they had been removed from vehicles that police had probable
cause to believe contained contraband); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985)
(upholding a school administrator's warrantless search of a high school student's purse
on the grounds that the fourth amendment does not require school officials to obtain a
warrant before searching a student and that searches of students by school officials are
not subject to the probable cause requirement); cf Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966) (use of secret government informant not covered by the fourth amendment's
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures). Thus, any reform in the en-
trapment area will have to come from Congress.
169 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-82 (1963) (with or
without warrant, arresting officer needs more than mere suspicion to make an arrest).
170 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975) (policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a suspect);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71 (1971) (police can seize items in
"plain view" while executing a search warrant that names other objects).
"I' See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985) ("The fundamental
command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasona-
ble . . . ."); cf. Dix, supra note 14, at 294 (proposing that the Supreme Court adopt
the view that "deception [by undercover agents] constitutes a 'Search' within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment. This action would make the flexible concept of reasona-
bleness available for development of the basic limitations on undercover investigations
essential to the drawing of well-founded operational rules.")
19851
1222 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
forth the procedural requirements of the warrant hearing and the pre-
trial motion, this statute should specify the contents of the affidavit
upon which the warrant may be issued.1 72 It should also set forth
guidelines for the magistrate conducting the reasonable-suspicion in-
quiry regarding the information that may be considered and the types
of undercover methods that may be approved. The statute should con-
tain examples of acceptable types of information and undercover meth-
ods but should set forth few, if any, per se rules. Rather, the magistrate
should be permitted to conduct a flexible inquiry into the reasonable-
ness of the proposed inducement. The following section outlines the
kinds of information that a magistrate may reasonably consider at the
wArrant hearing and the kinds of methods that agents may reasonably
employ in an undercover operation.
1. Information Supporting Reasonable Suspicion
The principal source of information providing the basis for reason-
able suspicion will undoubtedly be informants or middlemen. The use
of informants and middlemen in the Abscam173 and the DeLorean' 7 '
investigations demonstrates the importance of determining the reliabil-
ity of such individuals.17 5 A magistrate should not depend on informa-
tion obtained from these sources unless the investigating officer's affida-
vit demonstrates why the informants are credible. 17' At a minimum, the
172 See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
I" In Abscam, informant Melvin Weinberg and FBI agent Anthony Amoroso re-
lied on a number of individual officials whom they knew to be corrupt to bring in
public officials for bribe offers. These middlemen did not know that Weinberg and
Amoroso were working for the FBI. They too were indicted and convicted along with
their principals. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
174 See Cummings, Agent Says He Opened DeLorean Drug Talks, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1984, at 24, col. 1.
" Middlemen Errichettiand Silvestri, who led the FBI to several of the Abscam
subjects, did not even know several of the legislators they claimed to "own." SELECT
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 68-77. In middleman Ciuzio's first meeting
with Weinberg and Amoroso, he indicated that Congressman Richard Kelly was al-
ready taking money and was under Ciuzio's virtual control. Ciuzio's claims were false.
See United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). Nevertheless,
"[iln some cases, the FBI continued to rely on middlemen even after they had proved to
be unreliable." SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19; see also EDWARDS
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 58 ("[Tlhe record in [Operation] Corkscrew
demonstrates an utter failure on the part of the [FBI] to do even rudimentary checking
of [the middleman's] credibility or to seek confirmation of his assertions, even in the
face of mounting evidence of his duplicity.").
178 In developing standards for evaluating the credibility of informants, reference
should be made to the test set out in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and
explicated in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Aguilar, the Court held
that an application by police for a search warrant on the grounds that they had "re-
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officer should be required to show how well the informant knew the
target and how the informant obtained the relevant information.
Whether the informant had some kind of track record would also be
probative, as would the informant's reputation for trustworthiness."'
The police will also be able to rely on the usual variety of evidence
used to support the initiation of investigations. For instance, a sting
designed to trap dealers in stolen property would be justified by the
disappearance of a great deal of property in a given locality or indica-
tions that such property was being sold in a certain locality. 178 Scams
designed to root out corruption in the administration of justice could
rest in part on observations that justice is being dispensed in an irregu-
lar manner.179 Through police observation or community complaints
there may be indications that a certain neighborhood is being flooded
with narcotics. There may be a strange pattern in a city's contract as-
signments that gives rise to an inference of government corruption, 80 or
a barrage of immigration bills introduced in Congress indicating that
the process is being misused. 81
ceived reliable information from a credible person," 378 U.S. at 109 (quoting the affi-
davit supporting the search warrant application), was insufficient to establish probable
cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. The Court held that a proper applica-
tion must set forth the "underlying circumstances" surrounding (1) how the informant
came across the information and (2) why the informant should be deemed credible. See
id. at 114. If these requirements could not be satisfied, a sufficient amount of accurate
anecdotal detail, discoverable only to those in the know, might justify issuing a warrant
on the basis of the tip. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417-18.
The two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test was rejected, however, in Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that the credibility of an informant's tip should be evalu-
ated with reference to the totality of the circumstances). The proposal advocated in this
Comment is consistent with the Gates standard: a careful consideration of the proffered
information in light of the totality of the circumstances, buttressed by a dialogue with
the informant as to the basis of the informant's knowledge, would be an appropriate
degree of anterior justification. See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 551 (question by
James F. Neal, Chief Counsel to the Select Committ'e) (suggesting that FBI agents
question informants to determine credibility); id. at 941 (question by Malcolm E.
Wheeler, Deputy Counsel to the Select Committee) (recommending a similar proce-
dure); Guidelines on FBI Use of Informants and Confidential Sources, reprinted in
SELECr COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 520 (listing factors to consider in deter-
mining suitability and reliability of informants).
17 A bad track record would obviously weigh against a finding of credibility. Er-
richetti and Silvestri demonstrated on numerous occasions that they could not be relied
on to refrain from involving innocent people in corrupt activities. Nevertheless, the FBI
took action solely on these informants' naked assertions of a target's corruptibility. See
Hearings, supra note 9, at 972-75 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union).
178 See Weiner, 46 Charged After 'Sting' in S. Philadelphia, Philadelphia In-
quirer, Nov. 2, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
179 See Dickerson, The FBI, in a 3 -year-long Sting, Dropped Its Net Over Chi-
cago Courts, Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 2, 1984, at F3, col. 3.
180 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
181 Although there had been criminal abuse of the private immigration bill pro-
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It is important that a magistrate not rely upon evidence uncovered
in a wide-reaching, long-term operation like Abscam to establish rea-
sonable suspicion of an individual subject's criminality unless the oper-
ation was itself justified.' 82 Otherwise, even if the broad-based scam
had no independent justification, it could provide the initial justification
for the individual stings. This process would introduce evidentiary
bootstrapping into the reasonable-suspicion inquiry: an unwary inno-
cent could be enticed into criminal activity by the initial operation, and
the agents could then use these government-induced crimes to show
reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal involvement.
Within the confines of the Abscam operation itself, the FBI devel-
oped reasonable suspicion as to the corruptibility of several of the indi-
vidual politicians 8" to whom they offered criminal inducements. How-
ever, the information indicating that the Abscam targets were corrupt
was obtained in the course of a general operation designed to test the
criminal propensities of politicians at large, for which there was no
prior justification. 8 Under the reasonable-suspicion requirement, a
general scam like Abscam would be permissible only after the FBI had
developed reasonable grounds for believing that political corruption was
a problem in a particular geographical area or legislative body.'" 5
2. Reasonable Undercover Methods
Standards of reasonableness will control the execution as well as
the initiation of the undercover operation.' The investigator's ability
to alter the structure of the operation, and the particular tactics used to
achieve the undercover goal, will be governed not by per se rules, but
by their reasonableness given the facts of each individual case. Thus,
cess, see United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979), there was no recent evidence
of even an unreliable nature that immigration bills were being sold by members of
Congress when FBI operatives launched the so-called Asylum Scenario of Abscam, see
Hearings, supra note 9, at 964 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union).
182 Cf 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.4, at 612 (1978). Frequently, "challenged evidence is 'secondary' or
'derivative' in character.... In these situations, it is necessary to determine whether
the derivative evidence is 'tainted' by [prior government misconduct]. To use the phrase
coined by Justice Frankfurter, it must be decided whether that evidence is the 'fruit of
the poisonous tree.'" Id. (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)).
188 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 969 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative
Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
's' See id. at 964.
188 See id. at 988-89.
188 See Gershman, supra note 14, at 1588 ("The 'reasonableness' criterion will
encourage courts to avoid the unsatisfactory 'end-justifies-the-means' analysis employed
by the Abscam courts.")
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while any encouragement tactic will be narrowly tailored to achieve the
legitimate purpose of testing the criminal propensities of one reasonably
suspected of crime, 18 7 the warrant authorizing the activity will be flexi-
ble enough to allow for reasonably necessary amendment as required
by the fluid circumstances of the undercover operation.' The appro-
priateness of the tactics relied upon to induce the commission of crime
will be evaluated not according to categorical prohibitions, but accord-
ing to what is necessary to ensure the commission of crime by those
reasonably suspected of wrongdoing.
The warrant will include a description of the structure of the pro-
posed inducement, but this structure must be amenable to sudden, un-
foreseen changes in the circumstances of the investigation. Thus, there
should be an exception to the warrant requirement in the case of exi-
gent circumstances comparable to that available in the search-and-
seizure area.189 Certainly, if an officer is suddenly apprised of an indi-
vidual's dangerousness and is in a position discreetly to offer the indi-
vidual an opportunity to commit an illegal act, the officer should not be
required to secure a warrant beforehand. Similarly, if in the course of
an investigation into the potential criminality of one suspect, a person
not mentioned in the warrant expresses interest in participating in the
criminal enterprise, the agent could make an offer to that individual
under the exigent-circumstances exception. 9 However, any major, de-
liberate shift in target or emphasis would require prior authoriza-
tion. 91 Furthermore, if an entrapment scheme turned sour as it became
clear that the target was not interested in taking the bait, reasonable
suspicion would disappear and the warrant would no longer be
1 The requirement that the undercover methods be narrowly tailored to the situ-
ation can be compared to the particularity requirement for search warrants. See, e.g.,
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (warrant must "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (problem with general warrant "is not that of intrusion per se,
but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings); Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (particularity requirement leaves nothing to discretion of
officer).
I8 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982) (allowing for extension of warrant); 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(d)(2) (1982) (same).
189 See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (establishing exigent-circumstances
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement in search-and-seizure cases).
190 As in the cases upholding a warrantless seizure of suspicious items in plain
view when the officer's access to the item has some prior justification, an undercover
agent could make an offer when discovery of potential criminality is inadvertent. Cf.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (upholding warrantless seizure of balloon after
valid stop of defendant's car).
1' The unauthorized shift in targets and emphasis was the worst aspect of the
Abscam operation. See supra notes 56-77 & 159 and accompanying text.
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valid.' 92
The approach proposed here addresses many specific concerns ex-
pressed by commentators and courts about particular inducement tech-
niques. Practices particularly deplored include the offering of excessive
inducements,19 government provision of contraband,' 9 4 manipulation of
a subject's sympathy, 195 and repeated goading.'96 Under the reasonable-
ness standard advocated in this Comment, there would be no per se
rule against the use of these techniques. However, because such under-
cover tactics would be unreasonable in almost all instances, a magis-
trate would very rarely be justified in approving them.
Generally, the agents' reliance on techniques such as excessive in-
ducements and provision of contraband would indicate that the target is
not predisposed in any meaningful sense and does not pose a real threat
to society. Consequently, any law enforcement resources devoted to ap-
prehending such a target would be squandered. In extreme cases, how-
ever, circumstances may justify the use of manipulative undercover
methods. Magistrates should, therefore, have the leeway to permit oth-
erwise excessive tactics when the exigencies of the situation render these
ploys reasonable.
Some commentators have suggested a per se prohibitory rule
against excessive inducements. 197 According to this view,
If the inducement is unlikely to be replicated, then a defen-
dant responding to it poses little danger, and the enforcement
costs are largely wasted. If the inducement is unusually at-
tractive, then the possibility of deterring those tempted to
succumb is small, and the effort to deter them may again
produce a less than optimal allocation of resources. 9 '
A requirement that financial inducements mirror the opportunities
available in the real world is a hallmark of proposals for entrapment
192 Fourth amendment search doctrine requires that a search cease when the items
described in the warrant have been found and allows the search to be conducted only in
places where those items might be concealed. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 182, at §
4.10.
192 See United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
19" See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 362 (recommending
a finding of entrapment per se where contraband could not have been obtained without
government participation).
195 See, e.g., Dix, supra note 14, at 264-65.
196 See, e.g., id. at 260-61.
1'9 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 14, at 1587-90; SELECT COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 6, at 362.
198 Seidman, supra note 14, at 142-43; accord Dix, supra note 14, at 267, 270-
71; EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 37.
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reform."' 9 However, critics have pointed out that whether or not an
inducement is outrageous will depend largely on the circumstances and
situation of the individual target.200 The price paid to a wealthy mem-
ber of the United States Congress to compromise his office may be ex-
tremely high, but nevertheless justified.201 This observation does not vi-
tiate the argument that financial inducements must reflect the real
world, but supports the position that limits on inducements must be
determined by what is reasonable in each situation. The appropriate
level of inducement should be decided by magistrates at warrant hear-
ings on a case-by-case basis.
Another circumstance that some have urged should automatically
trigger an acquittal on the ground of entrapment is the provision of
contraband to the target by government agents.202 However, such a rule
would be too strict, for it would eliminate some justified, well-run oper-
ations. When undercover investigators attempt to infiltrate an illegal
business operation, such as a narcotics ring, it is not necessarily unrea-
sonable for them to supply contraband to the suspects under investiga-
tion, especially if such action will gain the suspect's confidence.2"' In
fact, in some cases the only effective way for agents to apprehend a
suspect may be by assuming the role of dealers or otherwise supplying
199 See, e.g., Dix, supra note 14, at 267, 270-71. But see SELEcr COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 370 (finding that federal law enforcement officials' use of
unacceptable police tactics, such as threats, manipulation of the target's personal life,
and provision of the sole source of illegal goods, is not of "sufficient frequency" to
justify broad legislative reform).
200 See SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 370-71.
201 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 620 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1984).
202 See, e.g., United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). The Supreme Court has rejected this
approach. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). In Russell, the defendant
had a "speed" shop in which he produced methamphetamine. The agent offered to
supply him with phenyl-2-propanone, an essential ingredient for the production of the
illegal drug, in return for one-half of the drug produced. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, overturned the appellate court's determination that, not-
withstanding the defendant's admitted predisposition, he should be acquitted because of
the "'intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise.'"
Russell, 411 U.S. at 427 (quoting United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.
1972)). In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), the Court went further by
holding not only that the defense of entrapment was unavailable because of the defen-
dant's predisposition, but also that the defendant had no valid due process claim, de-
spite the fact that the government had both supplied the drug to him and purchased it
from him. Justice Brennan protested that "[t]he Government is doing nothing less than
buying contraband from itself through an intermediary and jailing the intermediary."
Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Bueno, 447 F.2d at 905).
203 The dissenters in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), took a differ-
ent view, considering such involvement in the commission of the crime to be "precisely
the type of governmental conduct that the entrapment defense is meant to prevent." Id.
at 447 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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contraband.
Rather than adopting a per se rule, a magistrate should ascertain
the availability of the disputed ingredient.2" 4 This inquiry would help
determine whether the government's supplying of contraband was rea-
sonable. If the contraband is impossible or nearly impossible to obtain
because of either its scarcity or the subject's limited resources, the gov-
ernment's supply of it would render "the offered opportunity an unreli-
able indicator of the subject's general dangerousness."20 5 In other
words, if the contraband in question is generally unavailable, it would
be impossible to develop the required level of reasonable suspicion
before the fact. If, however, the contraband is generally available to the
target from sources other than the government, it may be reasonable to
allow the agents to provide it.
The manipulation of a subject's emotions, whether it be through
sympathy, personal loyalty, or sexual favors,206 is another tactic that
would lead some observers to find entrapment per se. The exploitation
of Sorrells' sentimentality 07 and Sherman's pity208 arguably explains
their acquittals, regardless of the doctrinal approach followed. In nar-
cotics cases, such appeals to sympathy are apparently not uncommon.
In one case, the officer pretended to have a withdrawal seizure on the
sidewalk, and importuned a passerby to procure heroin for him to re-
lieve his misery.209 In another, an informant friendly with the defen-
dant begged the defendant to secure heroin for him because "he was
sick and needed something."210
Emotional manipulation would never meet the standard of reason-
ableness. Such practices offend not only because they play unfairly
upon generous human impulses, but also because their use suggests that
there was a lack of real justification for testing the virtue of these indi-
viduals. If any identifiable grounds of suspicion existed in these cases,
204 Cf The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, re-
printed in SELECT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 539-41 (operation may not
be initiated without express authorization by the Undercover Operations Review Com-
mittee and the Director of the FBI if an individual working through the FBI "will seek
to supply an item or service that would reasonably be unavailable to criminal actors but
for the participation of the government").
205 Dix, supra note 14, at 277.
206 See id. at 261-63.
207 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
208 See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
209 See United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169, 170 (3d Cir. 1954). In Sawyer, the
defendant's conviction by the district court was overturned in part because the judge did
not properly instruct the jury on the entrapment defense. See id. at 170.
210 See State v. Randolph, 290 A.2d 919, 919 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972). In Ran-
dolph, the court rejected the entrapment defense on the ground that the defendant
showed no reluctance to buy the contraband. See id. at 920.
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there would be no reason to resort to such tactics. Therefore, under the
reasonable-suspicion approach, such activities would always be
unwarranted.
21 1
Another element that may have tipped the balance in favor of de-
fendants Sherman and Sorrells was the persistence with which their
seducers goaded them.21 2 However, at least one commentator opposes a
per se rule against repeated urgings.213 It may well be that the wary
criminal needs to be importuned several times before agreeing to the
proposed transaction. If a specific number of offers is established as an
upper limit, underworld figures will quickly learn how many times
they have to say "NO!" to ensure a strong case for a dismissal of the
prosecution on entrapment grounds. Thus, a flexible rule of reasona-
bleness should govern the persistence with which officials may urge the
target to break the law.
Agents must bear in mind, however, that there will be times, as
the case of the unfortunate Mr. Sherman poignantly demonstrated,
when several refusals will indicate that whatever suspicion the detective
had of the subject's criminal intent was mistaken. In such a case, fur-
ther importunings will be beyond the scope of the warrant, because any
reasonable suspicion of the subject's criminality will have disappeared.
This particular aspect of reasonableness will be more difficult to insure
than the others, because the decision is more subjective and must be
made by agents in the course of the operation. However, officials may
be deterred from improper encouragement tactics by the knowledge that
if they exceed the authority granted to them in the warrant, the even-
tual prosecution of the target will be barred at a pretrial hearing.
Under the standard of reasonableness advocated in this Comment,
police encouragement tactics must be narrowly tailored to the circum-
stances of each case. If the circumstances change during the course of
the operation, and reasonable suspicion remains, the magistrate may
give government officials greater leeway to devise means of luring sus-
pects into their hands. The exact methods employed will vary, so that
techniques that would be unreasonable when directed at some targets
will be acceptable means of apprehending others. Exploitation of sym-
pathy will never be a reasonable undercover tactic. Excessive induce-
ments and supplying contraband will almost never be reasonable, al-
21 While playing on a target's sympathy or loyalty would be unwarranted, an
agent would still be allowed to "make friends" with the target. Indeed, this course of
-action may be the only way that agents can penetrate an illegal operation.
212 Sorrells was asked for whiskey three times, see Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 439 (1932); Sherman acceded to Kalchinian's demands only after "a number
of repetitions," Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 371 (1958).
21 See Park, supra note 13, at 228.
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though some circumstances may call for such techniques. Finally, the
validity of repeated urgings will vary from situation to situation and
will require greater reliance on the independent judgment of the officer
on the scene.
CONCLUSION
The high stakes and drama that characterized the Abscam and
DeLorean operations illustrate vividly both the appeal and the danger
of elaborate, high-visibility undercover scams. The targets in these op-
erations were not of the highest moral caliber, as they demonstrated by
yielding to the temptations offered, but that does not necessarily mean
that they would have committed like crimes in the absence of FBI
encouragement.
There is something very frightening about the notion that the po-
lice are free to test the morality of individual citizens without restraint.
To address this fear, this Comment has argued that law enforcement
officials should be required to demonstrate reasonable suspicion that an
individual is engaging in criminal conduct before they will be author-
ized to test that individual's penchant for illegal transactions. Further-
more, reasonableness should govern every stage of the operation, so that
investigations validly initiated remain justified.
The Burger Court is cutting away at the body of law developed by
the Warren Court to protect individuals from overreaching by law en-
forcement bodies. Large-scale undercover operations like Abscam pro-
vide these institutions with unprecedented power to interfere with our
lives. It is up to Congress to restrain this power by enacting certain and
enforceable limits on the ability of the executive branch to lead citizens
into temptation.
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